Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)

1965

Fred Wilstead v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah, The Independent Coal & Coke Co., and
Continental Casualty Co : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Dale E. Anderson of Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for
defendants The Independent Coal & Coke Company and Continental Casualty Company.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, No. 10318 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4797

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRED WILSTEAD,
Plaintiff arul, Appellant,
vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISCase No.
SION OF UTAH, THE INDE10818
PENDENT COAL & C 0 KE )
COMPANY AND CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendanta arul, Responilenta.
IJNIVERSlTY OF UTAH

RESPONDENT'S

--- ~

Review ol an Awud

BRJi\f 1 5 1965

of~ -

LAW LIBRAR't
of utab

~. JUN~sfs D

···ci~;i-- 5·-·-··········
Dale E. "beeiiii1.··----.
FABIAN & CLEN'.O:MNm-800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for defendants The
Independent Coal & Coke Company
and Continental Casualty Company

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .... I
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION ...................................................... 2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .................... 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................. 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................

4

I. This Court's review is limited by Utah Code
Annotated 1953, Section 35-1-84 to a determination
of: .................................................................................. 4

( 1 ) Whether or not the Commission acted
within or in excess of its powers. ............ ....................

4

( b) If findings of fact are made, whether or not

s~ch findings of fact support the award under re-

view. ............................... ....... .......................................... 4
II. An injured employee ceases to be temporarily
and totally disabled when his physical condition is
such that he is only partially disabled and an injured
employee who is only partially disabled cannot be
entitled to total disability payments........................... 7

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 14
1

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Page

Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
70 Utah 333, 260 Pac. 27I ---------------------------····· j
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
79 Utah 532, I I P .2d 329 ----------------------------···· ~
Kelly v. Industrial Comm., 80 Utah 73, I2 P.2d
I I I 2 --------- --------- --------------- -- --------------- --------- ---------···· 5
Park City v. Industrial Comm., 63 Utah 205,
224 Pac. 655 ---------------------------------------------------·····
Peerless Sales Co. et al v. Industrial Comm. et al,
I07 Utah 4I9, I54 P.2d 644 -----------------------------···
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
58 Utah 608, 277 Pac. 206 -------------------------·--······II
Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
IOO Utah 96, no P.2d 367 -------------------------------· 5

STATUTES AND RULES
35-I-65 Utah Code Annotate d I953 ---------------------····· 1
35-I-66 Utah Code Annotated I953 ------------------------··
35-I-84 Utah Code Annotated I 953 ----------------------···· l

11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRED "\VILSTEAD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS10318
SION OF UTAH, THE INDEPENDENT COAL & C 0 K E
COl\IP ANY AND CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Statement Of The Kind Of Case
This is an action for the recovery of temporary
total disability compensation from January 11, 1963 to
July 13, 1964, the date on which appellant returned to
his old job or from January 11, 1963 to January 29,
1964, the date on which the medical advisory board
1

determined that appellant had a permanent partial dii.
ability of 20 per cent loss of bodily function.

Disposition By Industrial Commission
The Industrial Commission found that appellant
had been released for work by both Drs. Beck aua
Powell on January 11, 1963, and that his temporary
total disability terminated on January 11, 1963. The
employer had paid temporary total disability compen·
sation from the date of the injury until January II.
1963, for the full period during which appellant wa)
entitled to temporary total disability compensation.
Appellant was also entitled to a partial permanent dis·
ability for loss of bodily function of 20 per cent or 40
weeks at $44.50 per week in addition to the temporary
total disability previously paid.

Relief Sought On Appeal
Appellant seeks to obtain payment for temporary
total disability from the date his doctors released him
for work and from additional treatment until he was
actually reemployed, or, in the alternative, until the
l\Iedical Advisory Board gave him a rating of 20 per
cent permanent loss of bodily function.

Statement Of Facts
Appellant was injured on or about February IO,
· emp 1oymen t . H e wa s treated
1960 in the course of his
2

by Dr. Beck and Dr. Powell and had a spinal fusion
in June 1962.

On January II, 1963, Dr. Powell examined appellant and reported that:
"The patient appears to have had maximum
benefit from treatment and to have reached a
fairly stable state but with somewhat greater
permanent partial impairment than the average
disc patient. He will apparently be limited in
his range of activity to relatively sedentary types
of work. I would consider his permanent partial
impairment, as the result of disc disease and
spinal degenerative changes, to be approximately
fifteen per cent bodily function.
"No further diagnostic or major therapeutic
measures seem to be indicated."
Dr. Beck also examined appellant on January 11,
1963, and reported:
"I feel that Mr. Wilstead should be able to
return to work at the present time ...
"I do not feel that further active medical treatment is indicated at this time and estimate his
disability at IO per cent loss of bodily function."
Appellant did not feel that he was able to do a
full day's work at the same job he had at the time of
injury until he was actually reemployed at his old
job on July 13, 1964 (Record 62-63), but did believe
that he could have done "a light duty job" (Record
64).
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At the hearing of the l\'.ledical Advisory Board on
January 25, 1964, appellant was given a rating of a
20 per cent permanent partial disability.

Argument
I.

This Court's review is limited by Utah Code Anno·
tated 1953, Section 35-1-84, to a determination of:
( l ) Whether or not the Commission acted with·
out or in excess of its powers.
( 2) If findings of fact are made, whether or no!

such findings of fact support the award under review.

Appellant has not claimed that the Industrial Com·
mission acted without or in excess of its powers ana
the appeal is not based on a claimed violation by the
Commission of action beyond its powers. It appear~
that appellant bases his appeal on a claim that the Com·
mission's findings of fact do not support the awaro
made by the Commission. Appellant has not specifieu
particular findings of fact which fail to support the
award made.
The Commission found, as a fact, that appellan!
had been released for work by Dr. Beck and Dr. Powell
on January II, 1963. As a result of this finding ol
fact the Commission determined that appellant wa~
entitled to receive compensation for total disability ur
to January II, 1963.
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The Commission also found that the Medical Advisory Board had examined appellant on January 25,
1964, and had recommended a permanent partial disability rating of 20 per cent loss of bodily function.
Based upon this finding of the Medical Advisory Board
the Commission determined that appellant had a permanent partial disability of 20 per cent loss of bodily
function which entitled him to compensation for 40
weeks at $44.50 per week. This award of permanent
partial disability was subsequently paid by defendant
Independent Coal & Coke Company.
The record of this case fully supports the findings
of fact by the Commission and the facts as found fully
support the award made by the Commission. It is this
Court's function to determine if the facts found by the
Commission support the award made and its function
is not to review the evidence to determine whether there
is any evidence which could lead to a different award.
See, e.g., Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 100 Utah 96, no P.2d 367; Kelly V. Industrial
Comm., 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d lll2; Chief Consol. Min.
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 70 Utah 333, 260 Pac. 271;
Park City v. Industrial Comm., 63 Utah 205, 224 Pac.
655.
The language of this Court in the Kelly case is here
appropriate:
"In cases like this where compensation has
been denied, and the applicant dissatisfied with
the decision upon the facts has brou~ht the case
here by writ of review, we are committed to the
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rule that the review is limited to the question
whether the commission in denying compen t.o1
h
b"
.
sa ion
as ar ~trar11y. or capriciously disregarded un.
contradicted evidence. Kavalinakis v • Ind • c0111
67 Utah, 174, 246 P. 698; Banks v. Ind. Corn.
74 Utah, 166, 278 P.58; Rukavina v. Ind. Corn.
68 Utah, 1, 248 P. ll03. This is the correcl
standar~, 3:ccording to the weight of authority
for rev1ewmg such findings of fact made bv
courts a~d j.~ri~s in j~dicial proceedings. See
Annotation D1sregardmg uncontradicted tes·
timony in civil actions," 8 A.L.R. 796.
0

"\Ve therefore, upon this review, examine the
evidence, not to ascertain what weight or credi·
bility we should give it, not to determine whether
in our opinion a different result should have bm
reached, but whether or not the commission has
arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded and re·
fused to follow and give effect to uncontradicteu
testimony."
Appellant has argued in his brief (pp. 3-5) thal
because Dr. Powell subsequent to January 11, 1960.
on July 20 ,1963 examined him and determined at that
time that appellant might never be able to resume heavy
work and that his physical condition could improve
even more than it had in the past that this indicates
that the facts found by the Commission do not supporl
the award made. When Dr. Powell earlier determinen
that appellant had received maximum benefit from
treatment and that further diagnostic or major thera·
peutic measures were not indicated, he was not sayin~
that appellant would never get any better than he wa)
at that time. He was merely saying that appellant baa
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reached a point where it was more important for him,
from a medical point of view, to work than to receive
additional medical care. At that point appellant was
not "totally disabled."
The inferences to be drawn from the written reports of Dr. Powell are not conflicting and furnish no
basis for a determination by this Court that the Commission's findings are not supported by the facts as
found by the Commission.
There is no basis upon which the award of the Industrial Commission can be modified because the findings of fact made by the Commission fully support the
award made and this is as far as the statute permits
this Court to inquire.

II.
AN INJURED EMPLOYEE CEA~ES TO
BE TEMPORARILY AND TOTALLY DISABLED 'VHEN HIS PHYSICAL CONDITION IS SUCH THAT HE IS ONLY PARTIALLY DISABLED AND AN INJURED
EMPLOYEE WHO IS ONLY PARTIALLY
DISABED CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS.
The statutes which establish the amounts to be
paid injured employees are Sections 35-1-65 and 351-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953. These statutes provide payments to an employee when he is totally but
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temporarily. disabled and when he is partially but per.
manently disabled. It is axiomatic that when one is
only partially disabled he is not totally disabled and
vice versa.
This Court has previously held that determinatiou
of a permanent partial disability ends the period of
the temporary total disability. See, e.g., Peerless Sales
Co. et al v. Industrial Comm. et al, 107 Utah 419,
154 P.2d 644 (1944), where this Court said:
"It becomes apparent, therefore, that follow·
ing the accident which occurred to Morrison,
the doctors determined that he was suffering from
synovitiis or inflammation of the synovial mem·
brane of the left knee, for which he was given
medical treatment and hospitalization from time
to time until August 11, 1943, on which date it
was determined that the injury to the knee had
developed into ankylosis or a complete stiffen·
ing and loss of use of the left knee, and his dis·
ability was determined as of that date to be per·
manent partial, thus ending the period of tern·
porary total disability. He had been paid com·
pensation at the rate of $16 a week from Febru·
ary 20, 1938, to August 11, 1943, during t~i~
period of temporary total disability, or the per10d
in which efforts were being made to restore the
function of his left knee, and during which tme
he was totally disabled f ram perfarming anu
work. This compensation was clearly paid under
the provisions of Sec. 42-1-61, supra. N?w, when
his disability became fixed and certain, unde
the circumstances stated, the payment of com·
pensation fell under the provisions of Sec. 42·
1-62, supra, for the specified loss of the use 01
1
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a rnember of his body. Twenty-five weeks' compensation under this permanent partial disability
had been paid at the time the State Insurance
Fund ceased making payments, to-wit, February
1, 1944 ; hence the order of the Commission is
proper directing plaintiffs to pay to Morrison
125 weeks' compensation for such permanent
partial disability "in addition to the compensation" already paid him for temporary total disability. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821, and particularly the
later case of the same title in 60 Utah 553, 210
P. 611; Continental Gas. Co. v. Ind. Comm.
70 Utah 354, at page 364, 260 P. 279; and se~
cases collected in 88 A.L.R., commencing at
page 385." (Emphasis agded).
Also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
79 U tab 532, 11 P .2d 329 ( 1932), where this Court
said:
"If the hearing of October 7th can be considered as having proceeded under a new application, then, if the first permanent partial status
(which is the only status with which the plaintiffs under the evidence are concerned and in regard to which, under the state of the evidence,
they could be bound) became fixed as early as
January 13, 1929, the date which, at all events,
the ternporary total disability ceased, it would
appear that the statute of lirnitations h~ run
as to such clairn. The fact that a change m the
condition of the applicant occurred due to subsequent accidents while under other emp~oy.ers
cannot alter the situation as far as these plamtiffs
are concerned, because there was no causative
connection between the first injury and the two
subsequent injuries, and consequently any
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change of condition after January 13, 1929 18·
~ot referable to the first injury. Conseque~tJ
it stands .th~t the commission having, as far !s
these plamhffs are concerned, made a finding
only as to the permanent partial status as of
J ~~uary 13, 1929, a!ld that no change of con·
d1hon was shown or m fact could, with such evi·
dence as was introduced concerning the final
status, have been shown so as to be binding on
these plaintiffs as resulting from the first acci·
dent, the statute must have run if the hearing
of October 7, 1931, is to be considered as a new
application for compensation for the permanent
partial disability fixed as of January 13, 1929."
(Emphasis added.)
The fact is that appellant had recovered sufficiently
from his injury by January II, 1963, to receive a per·
manent partial disability rating of IO per cent by Dr.
Beck and of 15 per cent by Dr. Powell. The fact that
appellant did not obtain a rating from the Medical
Panel until January 29, 1964, does not affect the con·
dition of his physical recovery when examined by the
treating physicians. The date of the examination h1
the Medical Advisory Board may, in an appropriate
case, be important if there is no evidence as to whether
an injured employee ceased to be totally disablea
prior to the date of the examination by the Medical
Advisory Board. In this case there is substantial ano
persuasive evidence that appellant was not totally dis·
abled after January II, 1963, as the Commission de·
termined.
Appellant cites a letter from Mr. Wiesely, Chair·
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man, Industrial Commission, to T. Van Campen (Br.
p. 6). It is not known what the facts and circumstances
giving rise to this letter were. The letter is not a part
of the record of this case and is not appropriate for
consideration by the Court.
This Court has determined in the case of Spring
Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 58 Utah 608,
277 Pac. 206 ( 1929), that an employee is not totally
disabled when he cannot return to his former employment but could perform the work of some other employment. The Court said:
"It remains to be determined whether or not
the evidence in the case at bar brings the applicant within the general provision of section 3139.
It is not always an easy task to determine what
constitutes total disability. It will rarely be
found that two cases present the same facts.
Keeping in mind the purposes of our Workmen's
Compensation Laws, it may be said generally
that, where the injured employe's earning power
is wholly and permanently destroyed, and because of his injuries he is incapable of performing remunerative employment, such employe is
permanently totally disabled. Stated conversely,
if an injured employe is not prevented from
securin.g and retaining employment becau~e of
his injuries, and if he can perform the duties of
such employment without.pain .or sufferin? and
without undulv endan,qerzng his health, Zif e, or
limb then and in such case, the employe is not
totalb1 di;abled. To make out a case of total
disability, the applicant is not required .to show
that he is incapacitated from performmg any
and all kinds of work. On the other hand, he
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is required to put forth an active effort to procure s1;1c~ emplo_yment as he is able to perform.
If he is incapacitated from performing the kind
?f labor required in his for mer employment, but
is able to perform the work of some other employment, he is not totally disabled. The following authorities support or tend to support such
a general rule: 28 R.C.L, § 106, p. 820; I •. R.A.
1916A, 145; American Zinc Co. of Tennessee
v. I:us_k, .1~8 Tenn. 220, 255 S.W:. 39; Employers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Williams
et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S.\V. 210; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Weir et al.
(Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S.W. 565; Home Life
& Accident Co. v. Corsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 216
S.W. 464; Bishop v. Millers' Indemnity Under·
writers (Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S.W. 4ll; In re
Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N.E. 601, Ann Cas.
1916A, 787; Roller v. Warren et al., 98 Vt.
514, 129 A. 168; Employers' Mutual Ins. Co.
et al. v. Industrial Commission of Colorad-0,
65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314; Dosen v. East Butte
Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 880;
Moore v. Peet Bros. Manufacturing Co., 99
Kan. 443, 162 P. 295; Sakamoto v. Kemmerer
Coal Co., 36 \Vyo. 325, 255 P. 356; Comolida·
tion Coal Co. v. Crislip et al., 217 Ky. 371, 289
s.w. 270."
"The evidence in this case shows that the ap·
plicant has suffered a seri~us injury, bu~ we are
of the opinion that there is no substantial com·
petent evidence which brings him within the class
of 'permanent total disability.' The case .~as
disposed of upon the tl?eory t~at the cond1t10n
of applicant's legs entitled him to an awar~
for permanent total disability, regardless 0d
whether he was or was not able to secure an

12

retain employment. It is a matter of common
knowledge that persons with injuries similar to
those sustained by the applicant are able to and
do perform the duties of some kinds of employment. It cannot be said as a matter of law under
our Workmen's Compensation Law that one
who has his legs partially paralyzed, as does the
applicant, is unable to secure any kind of employment and perfarm the duties thereof . ..."
(Emphasis added).
There is no judicial nor statutory authority for
appellant's claim that an injured employee who could
du light work must be given light work by his former
employer or that the former employer must pay him
total disability compensation. The cases cited by appellant from other jurisdictions are inapposite here. The
statutes here in question are not unemployment compensation statutes but are disability compensation
statutes. '¥hen the employee is totally disabled he is
entitled to the compensation provided for total disability. When he is only partially disabled he is entitled
to the compensation provided for partial disability and
the fact that he is unable to perform his former work
while partially disabled does not, under the statutes,
entitle him to total disability payments while he is unemployed. The statute contains no requirement that
the former employer furnish a light duty job different
than the one the employee held prior to injury or be
required to pay total disability compensation for failure
to provide such light duty employment.
The only statutory basis for payment of total dis-
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ability payments to appellant beyond January 11,
1963 is if he is totally disabled and not otherwise. The
Commission determined that he was not totally disabled
after January 11, 1963 and this finding supports the
award made.

Conclusion
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed with preju·
dice.
Respectfully submitted,
Dale E. Anderson
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for defendants The
Independent Coal & Coke Company
and Continental Casualty Company
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